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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THERALD N. JENSEN, Executor of the)
Estate of CLARENCE ANDERSON, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS.

HENRY 0. ANDERSON and DOROTHY \
ANDERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants,

Case No.
11367

VS.

ROBERT RADAKOVICH,
Intervenor-Respondent
BRIEF OF INTERVENOR AND RESPONDENT,
ROBERT RADAKOVICH
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for specific performance of an Option
to Purchase.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court and an advisory jury.
From a verdict and judgment for the Intervenor, the Plaintiffs and Defendants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent submits that the decision and judgment
of the court below should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Intervenor agrees generally with the Statement of Facts
set forth in the Brief of Plaintiff and Defendants except in the
following particulars:
(a) The Defendants in their Answer and Counterclaim
to Plaintiff's Complaint asserted an undivided one-half intPre8t in all of the property, real and personal, described in
1

Plaintiff's Complaint (R-14) ;
(b) The "Option to Purchase", Plaintiff's (Intervenor's)
Exhibit 1, was admitted into evidence without objection
(TR-21) ;
(c) Six 0f the eight jurors answered the Interrogatory
submitted to them in the affirmative (R-116)
(R-Minute
Entries, Page 5), which was the only genuine issue of fact
raised.
( d) The monetary value of Defendants' interest in the
property described in Plaintiff's Complaint was fixed by the
court below pursuant to the written Stipulation between the
Plaintiff and the Defendants (R-117)
(R-Minute Entries,
page 5).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Respondent will follow the general order of the points
specified in Appellants' Brief and shall endeavor to cover
each such point in the order enumerated.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE IS NOT INDEFINITE
OR UNCERTAIN AND DOES NOT RESERVE TO THE
OPTIONEE ANY OBJECTIONABLE UNLIMITED OPTION TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF HIS ACCEPTANCE OF ITS TERMS.
The Option given by Clarence Anderson to Intervenor
extended to Intervenor the right to purchase "any or all" of
Anderson's livestock and farming operation (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1). The fact that Intervenor was given the power
to designate the quantity of the property he might choose to
acquire, does not make the Option indefinite or uncertain so as

to preclude specific performance. Once the Option is exercised and the designation of property made by the Optionee,
the offer and acceptance are complete and an agreement,
specifically enforceable against either party, arises. The only
uncertainty involved is whether or not the optionee will
choose to exercise his option. To this extent every option, no
matter how framed, is indefinite and uncertain. As pointed
out in Williston on Contracts, Volume I, 3rd Edition, Section
W, page H7:
"The place of performance, the quantity of goods, or
lands to be sold or bought, the kinds of goods, or the
method of shipment may be left optional to the promissee".
The principle is stated in 46 Am. Jur., page 250:
"An offer to sell expressly leaving the determination
of the amount of the commodity to the Buyer gives
rise to a binding agreement upon an acceptance by
the Buyer designating the amount".
And again at 46 Am. Jur .., page 250:
"The offeror may be bound by an offer to sell which
allows the off eree to determine the quantity which
he will accept . . . . mere uncertainty of the quantity
involved does not prevent the arising of an obligation."
An offer may contain a choice of terms submitted to
the offeree from which he is to make a selection in his acceptance. Such an off er is necessarily indefinite, but, if
accepted in a way contemplated, the ultimate agreement of
the parties is made definite by acceptance. (Williston on
Contracts, Volume 1, 3rd Edition, page 109)
Reference is made to the case of De Remer vs. Anderson
Nevada 287; 169 P. 737) where Anderson claimed an
option to purchase "all or any part of the land leased". Anden1on designated a tract containing 5.21 acres out of a
larger tract and the Nevada court while holding the option
(H
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unenforceable did so because the evidence did not show which
party was to make the partial designation, saying:
"The rule, as asserted by some commentators and
courts, that a contract giving one of the parties the
right of selection of the lot or lots to be conveyed is
not incapable of specific performance, would be applicable here, if the conditions of the contract or the
facts presented were in keeping with the rule. In the
matter at bar the absence of designation in the contract as to who was to make the selection constitutes
an element which removes this case from the rule.
Further, had appellant, in view of the terms of the
lease, sought to purchase all of the tract of land, the
expression "all or any part", as set forth in this lease
might have been a sufficient description."
In this case Intervenor was given the option to designate
the property to be purchased (Pl's Exhibit 1) and he exercised the option by designating "all" of the property owned
by Anderson. (R-10)
This court in the case Calder vs. Third Judicial District
Court (2 Utah 2d. 30.9; 273 P. 2d 168; 46 ALR 2d. 887) ruled
that a contract for the purchase of land, a part of which was
to be selected by the purchaser from a larger tract was valid
and specifically enforceable. (Cited favorably in Marcinak
vs. West Indies Investment Co. 2.9.9 F. 2rl. 821). In so deciding,
this court distinguished the case of Reed vs. Lowe (8 Utah 3.9;
29 P. 7 40) which case Reemed to take a contrary view by
noting that in the Lowe case, (as in De Remer vs. Anderson,
supra) the uncertainty really arose because the parties had
not agreed which one of them was to make the selection of
property. (See also Delaney vs. Shellabarger (Nev.), 353 P.
2d. 903). (Fleishman vs. Woods (Cal.) 67 P. 276, where a
selection of part of a tract to be made by the seller was held
to be specifically enforceable by the purchaser).
Since the Intervenor chose to exercise his option by
seeking to purchase "all" of the property owned by the de4

cedent there is no problem in specifically identifying the
property to be acquired. The property is readily identified
from Carbon County records, tax records, the Inventory filed
in the Estate of Clarence Anderson, Deceased, from the Option
itself, and from the Complaint of Plaintiff and Answer of the
Defendants. As stated by this court in Cummings vs. Nielson
(42 Utah 157; 129 P. 619) and followed in Johnson vs. Jones
(109 Utah 92; 16/, P. 2d. 893); and Nielsen vs. Rucker (8 Utah
2d. 302; 333 P. 1067):

"It is elementary that in equity that is certain which can
be made certain. In case certain lands are mentioned by name
merely in a contract, without giving a definite description,
the lands intended in the contract may always be shown by
extrinsic, parol or documentary evidence."
There is no uncertainty or indefiniteness as to the property
covered by the Option so as to preclude its specific performance.

Appellants contend the Option is so uncertain as to terms
of payment as to make it unenforceable. A reading of the
Option (Pl's Ex. 1) shows that the purchase price is readily
ascertainable; the down payment is specified ( % of purchase
price) ; the interest rate is specified ( 5 %) ; and the ultimate
time for final payment is stated (on or before 17 years from
date of sale).
Reference is made to the case of Thomas vs. Johnson
(55 Utah 424, 186 P. 437) where it was claimed that the option
involved was too vague and uncertain to be enforceable. The
terms of payment were as follows: "% cash, % on or before
December 15, 1917, balance 10 years time at 8% per annum".
This court held that such terms were sufficiently definite and
Rubject to specific enforcement.
This case now before the court is no less certain and the
5

performance required of Intervenor is sufficiently stated.
In the Thomas vs. Johnson case supra, it was claimed to
the Supreme Court that the security afforded the seller was
inadequate and indefinite just as Appellants now suggest in
their Brief. However, the question of adequacy of security
was never raised by Appellants below and as this court said
in the Thomas case, (supm):
"If the security contemplated was so ii1'.ldequate as to
render the transaction inequitable and unenforceable,
it was incumbent upon the seller to establish the fart
to the satisfaction of the court. Inadequacy of securitv
is not made an issue in the pleadings; the evidenc~
offered by Seller does not disclose it." Fitzgemld v~.

Boyle (.57 Utah 234; 193 P. 1109)

The situation is similar in the case now before the court.
Inadequacy of security has not been made an issue. Further,
the matter is now largely moot, since the Plaintiff has sold
all of the sheep and a substantial amount of the other personal
property covered by the Option in the Probate proceeding.
(R-127-128)
Appellants question the action of the court below in
"making certain" the payment of interest by requiring Intervenor to pay the same at least annually. In Thomas vs. Johnson, supra,. this court held that fixing an annual interest rate
alone was sufficiently definite so that the action of the court
below perhaps was favorable to Appellants in that there
would appear to be no reason why Anderson could not agree to
a contract where neither principal or interest should come due
until the end of the term.
In respect to the ruling by the court below that legal title
to the property covered by the Option should all remain in the
heirs of Clarence Anderson, Deceased, until paid for, this
would seem to be what was reasonably contemplated by the
parties and although the Option if uncertain should be con6

strued most strongly against the Intervenor, since he prepared
it, which principle was subscribed to by this court in Maw vs.
Noble (10 Utah 2d. 440; 354 P. 2d. 121) cited by Appellants,
the court further said :
"But this rule applies only where there is some genuine
lack of certainty, and not to strained or merely fanciful
or wishful interpretations that may be indulged in.
A contract must be looked at realistically in the light
of the circumstances under which it was entered into,
and if the intent of the parties can be ascertained
with reasonable certainty it must be given effect."
See Bunnel vs. Bills (13 Utah 2d. 83; 368 P. 2d .. 597)
The law does not favor, but leans against, the destruction
of contracts because of uncertainty; and it will, if feasible,
so construe agreements as to carry into effect the reasonable
intentions of the parties if that can be ascertained. Mclllmoil
vs. Frawley Motor Co. (Cal) 213 P. 971; Hunter vs. Sparling
(Cal) 197 p. 2d. 807.
Appellants cite the case of Pitcher vs. Lauritzen (18 Utah
2d. 368; 423 P .. 2d. 491) as compelling a conclusion that the
Option in this case is too uncertain to be specifically enforced.
Intervenor disagrees. While the court in Pitcher apparently
did not consider Thomas vs. Johnson (supra). its conclusions
reached in Pitcher would in no way reverse the position taken
in Thomas. In Pitcher the case was actually disposed of by a
finding of mutual abandonment, but the court went on to
say that irrespective of abandonment the earnest money receipt involved was so uncertain as to be unenforceable. While
it stated that the balance was to be carried by seller under
a contract "or" a second mortgage, there was nothing provided to show who should make that election, nor was the
length of the term stated over which payments were to be
made. Pitcher is not good authority to compel a finding of
uncertainty in the case now before the court.
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Likewise the case of Candland vs. Oldroyd (67 Utah 605;
248 P. 1101) cited by Appellants does not present facts analogous to the case at hand. In Candland an off er was made in
the alternative. The reply merely stated "your proposition is
accepted." The court held there was never such meeting of the
minds as would give rise to a binding contract.
In the case now before the court there is no uncertainty
in the Option to Purchase as to how long the Intervenor might
take to pay the purchase price; the instrument specifically
states that "the balance to be paid in 17 years from the date
of sale or sooner."
It is curious to note that while Appellants assail the
language in the Option to Purchase "an option to purchase
from me or my heirs any or all of the property I own" (PJ's
Ex. 1) as calling for an objectionable, unlimited election, the
plaintiff himself in his capacity as attorney for Clarence
Anderson prepared an had executed a Last Will and Testament
whereby Clarence Anderson extended to Plaintiff's son a
right to acquire from the estate after his death the real property Clarence Anderson may have owned at the time of his
death, using the following language:

"I grant to James T. Jensen the right to purchase any
part of my real estate at the inventory and appraisement value." (PJ's Exh. #9; TR 195; TR 224)
Thereafter the Plaintiff, in his capacity as Executor of
the Estate of Clarence Anderson, Deceased, petitioned the
court in the Probate proceeding for authority to convey the
same real property claimed by Intervenor under the exercise
of his Option to Purchase, to the said James T. Jensen pursuant to a so-called "election" under said Will. (Probate
File #3159, pages 30-36)
If the language used by Plaintiff in the Anderson Will
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was certain and clear enough to support a petition to the
Probate court, it would seem that similar language used in the
Option to Purchase (Pl's Exh. #1) would be equally certain
an<l understandable even though drafted by Intervenor, a
person with no legal background or training.
POINT II
THERE WAS CONSIDERATION FOR THE OPTION
TO PURCHASE.
An option is an offer, which if given without consideration may be withdrawn by the optioner at any time prior to
acceptance (55 Am. Jur. 502). However, if acceptance is
given prior to withdrawal, a binding contract is formed irrespective of whether or not there was any consideration for
the option itself (55 Am. Jur. 503).
If consideration is given for the option, it may not be
withdrawn except within the terms expressed in the option
itself. The consideration for the option is a thing apart from
the consideration for the sale ( 55 Am. J ur. 502).

The court below expressed himself as so believing the
law to be. (TR, 7)
The court below found that Intervenor exercised the
Option before it was withdrawn (Finding of Fact No. 10, R
125), but regardless of that Finding there was consideration
for the Option, as also found by the court below (Finding of
Fact No. 9, R 125).
The Option itself recites that Intervenor performed many
services for Clarence Anderson for which he was not paid,
(Pl's Exh. #1) and the testimony of the several witnesses
confirms the allegation.
The witness Valentine testified that Intervenor performed
work for Anderson at the farm and on the Schofield property
9

(TR 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28) ; the witness Marchello likewise
so testified (TR 45, 46, 47, 48) (worked on sheds twenty or
twenty-five different times) ;the witness Nielson so testified
(TR 66, 68) ; and the witness Allred so testified (TR 71, 72).
There is no evidence to the contrary.
The real question concerning these services performed
by Intervenor is not whether they were done "at no cost" to
Anderson but whether they were performed as a gratuity or
whether they were performed with the expectation that they
would be paid for in some way.

If the services were performed as a gratuity or gift with
no expectation or obligation of payment, then such services
could be characterized as "past consideration" and under the
rule set out in the authorities cited by Appellants, be insuf.
ficient as a legal consideration to support the Option to
Purchase.
However, the court below found and concluded that the
parties, as evidenced by the wording of the Option itself and
the nature and extent of the services performed, did contemplate that such services were not merely gratuitous but were
to be paid for at least in part by Anderson giving said Option
to Intervenor, and that the words "at no cost to me" used in
the Option were not an expression of gratuity, but were rather
a statement of fact that such services had not theretofore been
paid for. (R 125, 128)
The undisputed facts of this case show that Intervenor
performed substantial services for the deceased, as testified
to by the various witnesses already ref erred to; that there
was no relationship between Intervenor and the deceased to
indicate that such services were furnished or should have been
furnished as a gratuity on the part of Intervenor; that no
circumstances existed which would lead a reasonable person
to conclude such services were furnished merely as a gift; that
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the deceased clearly benefited from such services and knew
of their performance by Intervenor; and that, as recited in the
Option, no payment for such services had been made. Under
these conditions the court could reasonably find an implied
request for such services by Anderson and his implied promise
to p::i,y for the same. (Thomasic vs. Thom1sic 198 Atlantic
2d . .511; In re Stewart's Will, 100 New York Supplement 2d.
:J.'Jt,, 199 M?:sc. 1104, 108 New York Supplement 2nd 969, 279
A.jl?Jcllate Division 628; 17 Am. Jur .. 2d. 337; Restatement of
Contracts, Volume 1 Sec. 5; Gleason vs. Salt Lake City 74 P.
2rl. 1225; Mccollum vs. Clothier 241 P. 2d. 468). Intervenor
could not testify to these matters directly because of the Dead
Man Statute (78-24-2 Utah Code Annatated 1953, as amended)
invoked by Appellants (TR 86) but the circumstances of the
relationship and the nature of the benefit conferred reasonably compel the conclusion that good and sufficient consideration existed for said Option. Appellants have pointed to
nothing in the record, nor indeed can they do so, which could
reasonably compel any other conclusion.
The case of Manwill vs. Oyler (11 Utah 2d. 433; 361 P.
2d. 177) cited by Appellants does not in fact support their
position in this case. In Manwill the claimed oral promise to
pay was barred by the Statute of Limitations and the court
held that the bare moral obligation thereupon arising was not
valid consideration for the claimed subsequent promise. No
such situation exists in this case, but rather the circumstances
here reasonably permit the conclusion that Intervenor expected to be paid for his services and that Anderson expected
to pay him. M:irnon vs. Vaughan Motor Co. (Ore) 194 P. 2d.
9.92: Irons Investment vs. Richardson (Wash) 50 P. 2d. 42)
The court below having found all these matters in favor
of Intervenor, and there being substantial evidence in the
record to support such action, the judgment of the court below
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should not be disturbed on appeal unless all reasonable minds
would believe contrary to the finding of the court below. No
such conclusion is warranted in this case.
(Hank vs. Hales 17 Utah, 2d 344, 411P .. 2d. 836; Child vs.
Child 8 Utah 2d 261, 3."-12 P. 2d. 981; McCollum vs. Clothier
241 P. 2d. 468)

Appellants, at page 7 of their Brief, allude to an opinion
by Calvin Rampton, attorney, concerning said Option and
infer that he told Intervenor said Option was not legal. The
full record will show that such was not the opinion of that
attorney (published Deposition of Intervenor, page 15, lines
1-12), and in any event such opinion should have no more
bearing upon the issues before this court than that of any
attorney not before the court as an expert or in any other
capacity.
POINT III
THE JURY COULD NOT REASONABLY HAVE BEEN
PREJUDICED IN ANY WAY BY COMMENTS MADE IN
THEIR PRESENCE BY THE COURT BELOW.
Appellants contend the following observations and statements made by the court below in the presence of the Jury
were most prejudicial to Appelalnts' position:
(a) The court: "Well, I won't express my own opinion
concerning it at this time as to experts" (TR,
page 202, lines 3 and 4) ;
(b) The court: "Let's don't take all day to do it then"
(TR 161, page 19 and 20);
( c) The court: "Clarence Anderson? Tell me that?
How in the heavens could you have a Jury believe
that he can reproduce the signature of one now
12

deceased, who rarely wrote his signature?" (TR
161, line 1-3)
( d) The court: "All we know is we've got some signatures here which purport to be, which now purport
to be the signature of Clarence Anderson, other
instruments that purport to bear his signature,
let's get down to the thing and find whether they
are or not (TR 161, lines 13-16) ;
( e) The court: "I may use that word of the signature,
that appears on said exhibits .... " (TR 1667, lines
9-10);
(f)

The court: " .... does subordinate the claimant to
some interest he has and doubtless he signed it."
"He (Garcia, Appellants Expert Witness) can tell
us whether it's a genuine signature, as an expert
in this field, or whether it's not his signature"
(TR 197, lines 6, 7, 11, 12 and 13) ;

(g) The court: "It's a public record and purports to
be the signature and it is received in evidence."
(TR 200, lines 4-5) ;
(h) Extended comments of the court set out at pages
202 and 203 of Transcript of Proceedings.
( i)

The court: "You can't get someone to sign for
you, I am sure of that. No, I think they are legitimate instruments and I think they may be genuine,
but whether they are genuine for sure, I don't
know, but I think he has a right to say, Is that his
signature in your opinion. I think an expert must
contemplate that, that he is going to be asked
concerning that, similarities of one signature
purporting to be that of a man in question as
13

against other signaturess. How else could you
cross-examine the witness?" (TR 205, lines 8-16)
(The court ruling on admission of Exhibit 12) ;
(j)

The court: "What objection do you have Don't
you want that Jury to examine and determine
whether or not for example the signatures on the
Will correspond or differ from-wouldn't you want
that. I won't insist upon it and if you feel it is
unfair, but I don't think it is." (TR 299, lines 3-8).

While the court in the trial of the case should not express
his opinion as to what facts the evidence may or may not show,
the court certainly has some right, and duty, to inquire of
counsel concerning mattres which the court may reasonably
feel will bring the true state of the facts involved to the attention of the Jury.
The observations now objected to, which were not themselves rulings or orders of the court and to which no exceptions
were taken during the trial, were made by the court in connection with rulings concerning the admissability of documents purporting to bear the signature of Anderson, the
genuineness of whose signature on the Option to Purchase
was questioned, for the purposes of comparison by Appellants'
expert witness. The court did not state or inf er his opinion
as the facts to be ultimately determined by the Jury. There
is no showing that any substantial rights of the Appellants
were affected by the court in its conduct of the trial. (Rules
51 and 61 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Federated Milk
Producers Association vs. Statewide Plumbing and Heating
Co. 11 Utah 2d 2.95, 358 P. 2d. 348; Douglas vs. Duvall 5 Utah
2d 429; 304 P. 2d. 373; Fox vs. Taylor 10 Utah 2d 17 4; 350
P. 2d 154).
In any event the court fully instructed the Jury at the
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close of the case to the effect that the Jury should not consider
anything the court might have said or done during the course
of the trial as indicating in any way any feelings or opinions
in the matter and clearly informed them that they were the
exclusive judges of the facts. (Inst. No. 4, R 108)
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING ITS
INSTRUCTION NO. 12.
The basic document involved in this law suit is the Option
to Purchase (PJ's Exh. #1). Its execution by Anderson was
testified to by two witnesses, Valentine and Marchello (TR
20, 49 and 50) and the Exhibit was admitted into evidence
without objection (TR 21). It was thus endowed with a
presumption of validity. The language of the questioned
instruction (R 111) concerning the degree of proof necessary
to overcome such presumption is taken tlmost verbatim from
the case Hanks vs. Hales 17 Utah 2d 344, 411 P. 2d 836,. decided by this court in 1966. That "clear and convincing evidence" means a higher degree of proof than a mere "preponderance of the evidence" was stated by this court in the
case of Jimenez vs. O'Brien, 117 Utah 82, 213 P. 2d 337. The
instruction given was in accordance with law.
The burden of proof respecting the overall case was given
to the Jury in Instruction No. 16 (R115) and when the instructions are read in conjunction with each other it would
appear that Appellants' position in the case was more favorably stated than it should have been. Appellants did not in
any event request of the court an instruction of their own to
hetter explain the matter to the Jury.
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
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TO GIVE APPELLANTS REQUESTED INTERROGATORY
NO. 2 TO THE JURY.
Appellants have contended that Clarence Anderson was
illiterate and therefore did not understand the contents of the
Option he gave to Intervenor. They quoted to the court below
a definition of illiterate as being one:
"Unacquainted with letters, unlettered, ignorate of
letters or books, untaught, uninstructed in science. It
does not necessarily imply an inability to sign one's
name." (TR May 20, 1969, page 55)
Appellants offered no credible evidence whatever to support the claim that Anderson did not understand the terms of
the Option. The fact that a man may not be able to read or
count does not raise any inference that he is not capable of
understanding (TR 314-317). In this case the evidence and
inferences all point to the fact that Anderson did know what
he was doing. Intervenor read the Option out loud to Anderson
and Anderson said it was okay (TR 19, 20, 31, 32, 49, 50, 54);
Anderson had talked with Intervenor two or three weeks
before the Option was signed about land and sheep prices
(TR 51) ; Anderson purchased considerable building materials
(TR 65) for which he wrote checks in payment (TR 66, 67);
Anderson signed his name to pay checks (TR 76) and later
signed a Last Will and Testament with similar option provisions (Pl's Exh. #9) which was admitted to Probate as the
act of a man "of sound and disposing mind" (R Probate File
#3159, pages 15 and 16) ; and accumulated an estate consisting of two checking accounts, one savings account, considerable machinery and equipment, over 1,000 head of livestock, several thousand acres of land with water rights and
grazing permits, all valued at the time of his death in excess of $120,000 (R Probate File #3159, pages 27, 28, 29).
There is no credible evidence to support the request of Appellants to submit an issue of Anderson's possible lack of under16

standing to the Jury and the court below properly withheld
the same from the Jury, the court not being compelled in the
absence of such credible evidence to draw inferences favorable
to Appellants since all the credible evidence and inferences
therefrom pointed the other way. (Winegar vs .. Slim Olson
Inc. 252 P. 2d 205; Gregory vs. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad
Cu., 8 Utah 2d 114; 329 P. 2d 407).
POINT VI
THE LANDS AWARDED TO INTERVENOR BY THE
COURT BELOW WERE ALL EMBRACED WITHIN THE
OPTION TO PURCHASE.
The Option to Purchase gives Intervenor the right to
purchase "all of the property I own" and then says "consisting
of" describing generally land, sheep, buildings, machinery,
water rights, and hay. (Pl's Exh. #1). While generally agreements are constructed most strongly against those who prepare
them and where general and specific terms are used in the
same instrument, the specific provisions qualify the general
provision, the apparent purpose of the parties is given great
weight in determining the meaning to be given to manifestations of intention or to any part thereof (Restatement of Contracts, Section 236). A consideration of the entire Option
document makes it rather clear that the parties were dealing
with Anderson's entire livestock and farming operation.
Appellants particularly object to the inclusion of 160
acres in the Southeast Quarter of Section 34, Township 12
South, Range 7 East, SLB&M because it is alleged that title
Henry 0. Anderson. There is no evidence in the record to supto this land was in the joint names of Clarence Anderson and
port such assertion. On the contrary this particular property
is listed in the Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Henry
0. Anderson to quiet title (R 3) ; it is listed in the Probate
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Inventory and Appraisement in the Clarence Anderson Estate
(Probate File # 3159, page 28) ; it is listed by inference in
Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories where Plaintiff des.
cribes the mountain land as consisting of 3760 acres, the same
number of acres as listed in the court's Decree (R 53, 126);
it is listed in the property sought to be acquired by James
T. Jensen under the Option stated in the Last Will and Testa.
ment of Clarence Anderson, Deceased (R Probate File #3159,
page 32) and by the terms of the Stipulation entered into between Plaintiff and Defendants, the right of the estate to the
property was recognized in consideration of the payment of
$8,000.00 to Defendants in satisfaction of all of their claims
(R 117, 118). It is obvious that the 160 acres is part of
Clarence Anderson's property and is covered by the Option.
As regards the Miller Creek property referred to in the
Option, it is specifically referred to as "around 200 acres."
The actual acreage shown in Plaintiff's Complaint, the Inventory and the Petition by James T. Jensen, as well as the
Decree, all above referred to, and lying in Sections 16 and 21,
Township 15 South, Range 10 East, SLB&M, show a total
of 240 acres; well within a reasonable interpretation of even
the specific wording of the Option.
As regards the 640 acres referred to in Appellants' Brief
as being located in Section 2, Township 15 South, Range 9
East, SLB&M, there is absolutely no evidence in the record
concerning whether or not it is farm land, its location to
canals or when it was acquired by Clarence Anderson. The
record does show however that it is listed in Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories, the Petition of
James T. Jensen and the Inventory and Appraisement, all
above ref erred to. The character of this land is further explained and its relationship to the Clarence Anderson operation is shown by the facts that in Plaintiff's Answers to
18

[nterrogatories (R 52) this land is listed in conjunction with
what is referred to as the Miller Creek property, all having
a value of $20,000.00, and in the Inventory and Appraisement
filed in the Clarence Anderson Estate it is listed in conjunction
with the same Miller Creek property and for which an aggregate value for all such valley land is fixed in the amount of
$20,390.00 (R Probate File No. 3159, page 29).
Appellants obviously consider this 640 acres to be part
of the farm and livestock operation owned by Clarence Anderson and it is submitted that the same reasonably falls within
the terms of the Option held by Intervenor, and for which he
is by the courts Decree committed to pay the Option price
of $21,000.00 (Pl's Exh. #1, R 127, 133).
POINT VII
THE OPTION GIVEN INTERVENOR IS EFFECTIVE
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT HENRY ANDERSON AND
ANY PARTNERSHIP THAT MAY HAVE EXISTED BETWEEN HIM AND CLARENCE ANDERSON, NOW DECEASED.
Intervenor submits that all of the argument and authorities cited by Appellants in their Brief under their Point VII
are inapplicable and moot. The Appellants between themselves by Stipulation filed in this case (R 117-119) and
adopted by the court below (R 124, 128, 132, 133) have settled
the position of Defendants Anderson in respect to any claims
they may have in the matter. They specifically agree that
whatever interest Defendants had in the property listed in
Plaintiff's Complaint is limited to the sum of $8000.00 and
that the court might enter judgment accordingly against the
ERtate and in favor of Defendants. The Stipulation refers to
3760 acres of mountain land which is the total amount claimed
to have been held either as partnership property or as the
19

sole property of Clarence Anderson. Since Defendants have
settled their claim against the property for $8000.00 they have
no further interest in specific property and it can be of no
possible concern to Defendants what Clarence Anderson
agreed to do with the property.
It appears to be the position of Appellants (TR May 20,
1968, pages 4-46) that although as between themselves they
have fixed the full value of Defendant's interest in the entire
property involved in this law suit at $8000.00, and if Intervenor were not involved, Plaintiff could get a release from
Defendants of any and all claims in the specific property
upon payment of $8000.00, the fact that Intervenor is involved
to the extent that the court has ruled he is entitled to buy all
such property, Plaintiff wants to be paid the full purchase
price for all the property and Defendants want Intervenor
to pay them an additional $8,000.00 for their interest, even
though such interest is included in the full purchase price in
favor of Plaintiffs. The effect of this reasoning is that the
sum of the parts of a whole is greater than the whole. In
other words 2 plus 2 equals 5. Not only is this bad arithmatic,
but it is bad logic and no basis for a judicial decree.

CONCLUSION
The Decree and Judgment of the court below should be
sustained.
Respectfully Submitted,
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN for
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR &
MOODY
Attorneys for Intervenor
55 East Center Street
Provo, Utah
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